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The risk of armed conflicts between
states and state-like entities in the 
regions now seems remote. This is 
not to say that the potential for 
clashes between ethnic groups 
within states or for controversies 
between states has diminished 
significantly. 
Despite the inclusion of the entire 
peninsula in the prospective finalité
of European integration, the expected 
duration of the “association” phase 
and the exclusion of the wider 
Southeast European region from full 
EU membership for a protracted 
period of time poses new challenges 
to Europe and the region alike. 
In-between Legacies of Instability and Perspectives of Integration 
 
Last year’s roundtable Negotiating the Balkans, organised by the Bertelsmann 
Foundation and the Center for Applied Policy Research in co-operation with the Policy 
Planning Staff of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin on August 22-23, 
was characterised by the optimism related to the democratic victory of pro-European 
reform governments throughout the region. The optimism was qualified by the 
outbreak of inter-ethnic violence in Macedonia in spring. This unanticipated conflict 
was barely contained by the fragile, EU brokered Ohrid Agreement, signed just days 
before the conference. Since then, existing agreements have been upheld and new 
agreements have been brokered. Kosovo’s Constitutional Framework for Provisional 
Self-Government and the Belgrade Agreement for 
Serbia and Montenegro are recent examples of 
internationally mediated arrangements to defuse 
potential stability risks and to enhance the functioning 
of states. Evidently, the implementation of these 
agreements has suffered serious setbacks. The risk of 
armed conflicts between states and state-like entities 
in the regions now seems remote. Yet, the potential for clashes between ethnic groups 
within states or political controversies between states have not diminished 
significantly. Without the pressure of the shared perspective of EU membership, the 
political will and commitment in the region to negotiate bilateral and multilateral 
arrangements for unresolved issues – as envisaged in last year’s discussion paper – 
would dwindle.  
 
Today, regional co-operation and the perspective of EU membership are taking shape. 
The evolving network of bilateral free-trade agreements and the SEECP political 
dialogue of the Sofia Process are cases in point for regional commitment. Meanwhile, 
the EU’s 1999 promise to “draw the region closer to the perspective of full integration 
of these countries into its structures” has become the 
Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), 
designed much along the lines of the Europe 
Agreements for Eastern enlargement in the 1990s. 
Whereas the CARDS program provides “pre-
association” assistance, the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements (SAAs) define the criteria, 
objectives and strategic priorities for each country. 
The Stability Pact was once designed as a comprehensive strategy bringing together all 
relevant international organisations and donors for the stabilisation of the region. 
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Now, the Pact is increasingly remoulded along the lines of complementarity and will 
become an auxiliary to the EU association process for the countries of the region. 
 
For a Europe increasingly considering the Balkans as its responsibility and as part of 
its finalité, two epochal decisions are on the horizon; the NATO summit in Prague in 
November with the accession of up to seven new members and the European Council 
in December with the conclusion of accession negotiations with all East European 
candidates except for Romania and Bulgaria. This means that all of Southeastern 
Europe is included in the prospective finalité of European integration, but excluded 
from actual membership for a protracted period of time. The expected duration of this 
“association” phase poses new challenges to Europe and the region alike. The 
challenges concern the balancing of national, regional and European priorities as well 
as the management of political and public expectations. A balance has to be struck 
between the regionality of the Stability Pact and the conditionality of EU association; 
between exporting stability and importing instability; between state-formation and 
nation-building; as well as between European responsibilities and regional ownership. 
In the medium term the challenges range from unresolved status issues in and around 
the Belgrade-Pristina-Podgorica triangle to potential ethnic conflagrations within states 
or state-like entities, e.g. between Macedonians and Albanians in Macedonia or 
between Bosnians, Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Balkans has 
induced Europe to build up its engagement in terms of institutions, policy strategies as 
well as diplomatic and military capabilities. The current peacekeeping and policing 
missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo tax the emerging 
capabilities of the European CSDP in its first operating area. Europeans have assumed 
a leading role in the mediation between Belgrade and Podgorica as well as between 
Belgrade and Pristina, on the one hand, and in the governing of Kosovo and Bosnia as 
international protectorates, on the other. The structural and institutional dilemmas of 
the projected trajectory towards EU integrations require political will and a strategic 
vision.  
 
The objective is to create the preconditions for human security, well-being and 
prosperity for each and every individual in the region. Each of the often-cited 
principles and ideas has to derive its rationale and justification from this ultimate 
objective. This applies to the concepts of regional stabilisation, state functionality and 
national self-determination as much as to those of regional co-operation and even 
European integration. All key disputes involve the prioritisation and differentiation of 
these partially contradictory concepts for the region. Even though European 
integration has become the shared ideal for the individuals, communities, states, and 
nations as well as for the region as a whole, it is not self-evident. In the logic of this 
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The structural deficits and more 
recent legacies of the Balkans make 
functioning states the conditio sine 
qua non, European integration 
merely the Archimedean point of its 
future development. 
strategy paper, the structural deficits and more recent legacies of the Balkans make the 
functioning of states (i.e., rule of law, good governance, separation of powers, human 
and minority rights, etc.) the conditio sine qua non. European integration merely is the 
Archimedean point of its future development. Without codification and 
implementation of human and minority rights, national self-determination becomes 
meaningless. Without regional stability, the inward and outward consolidation of states 
remains a chimera. Regional co-operation is a direct precondition and indirect 
prerequisite for European integration, but its value for prosperity and stability will 
remain - independent of or even beyond EU accession.  
The roundtable addresses the above issues in four panels. First, a reflection on the 
consequences of the dominance of the European perspective for the region and the 
commitments involved, both on the part of the EU 
and on the part of its Southeast European partners. 
Secondly, regionality and regional ownership should 
be redefined and differentiated as functional 
prerequisites for political and economic 
development. In Southeastern Europe, co-operation is all too often understood as a 
sidetrack for the (indefinite) postponement of integration or as a pseudo-criterion of 
EU accession for appearances only. So far regional co-operation has been driven by 
the international community and has not (yet) become a self-sustaining endeavour in 
regional ownership. Thirdly, the issues of regional arrangements for status and non-
status issues with international mediation as debated at last year’s roundtable 
Negotiating the Balkans are revisited. This strategy paper upholds the argument that 
the functioning of states and state-like entities is the pivotal prerequisite, the conditio 
sine qua non for any sovereignty-related arrangements, not the other way around. 
Credible interim arrangements and a process towards a final-status arrangement have 
to be designed in order to prevent the status issues from stifling all progress as well as 
to facilitate the expansion of co-operation and the tackling of recurring stability risks 
generated by disruptive forces in the region. Fourthly, the final panel envisages a 
synthesis of the above issues of European integration, regional co-operation and status 
issues from the vantage point of the future Balkans as an integral and increasingly 
integrated part of Europe. Apart from the optimistic scenario of a linear, albeit 
protracted process towards EU membership, the synthesis also addresses the 
imponderabilities of structural deficits and regional specifics: Without political will 
and stamina on both sides, this European project could easily end in a quagmire of 
simulated reforms, shunned risks and diluted conditionalities. 
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1. European Integration: Prerequisites and Consequences 
 
In Southeastern Europe and in the countries of the Western Balkans in particular, 
transition towards pluralist democracy and market economy occurs in parallel to the 
evolving perspective EU integration. The links between transition and EU integration 
are much more pronounced here from the very beginning than they were in East 
Central Europe ten years ago. Delayed transition and weak states with a history of 
inter-ethnic and inter-state conflict have made the region a key concern for the process 
towards stability, integration, and prosperity in Europe as a whole. By now, the logic 
and momentum of European integration have made the inclusion of the Balkan states a 
foregone conclusion, a strategic inevitability.  
 
Once certain basic preconditions have been met and armed conflicts between states 
have become a remote risk in this region too, the conditionalities and normative 
prescriptions of EU membership become the framework of reference for the 
transformation of politics, civil society and the economy in each country of the region. 
The preconditions based on Helsinki 1975 and Copenhagen 1993 – recognition of 
borders, renunciation of violence, stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the 
rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities - have been met 
(with some notable exceptions though). Subsequently, the EU has installed the 
Stabilisation and Association Process, designed in analogy to the Europe Agreements 
of Eastern enlargement and offering bilateral contractual relations with the perspective 
of full membership in a European Union with 30 or more members. Now, the 
Copenhagen Criteria have become the framework of conditionality as well as the basis 
for annual assessments and policy prioritisations. 
 
The initial situation in Southeastern Europe now is quite different from the basis for 
political and economic transition in East Central Europe at the time of the Copenhagen 
European Council. The term “economic reconstruction” is a euphemism, as structural 
deficits in economic modernisation, infrastructure, and state administration loom large 
behind the immediate consequences of the conflicts of the past ten years. The 
weakness of the states in the region implies not only a distinct problem of aid 
absorption and aid addiction, but also an over-politicisation and a macro-political 
volatility detrimental to reform. Paradoxically, despite the weakness of the state, 
economic development for some time to come depends largely on political strategies 
and frameworks.  
 
In order to take into account the qualitatively different initial situation, the more 
pronounced regional heterogeneity and its fragmentation in terms of states and nations, 
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a Stability Pact providing massive, low-conditionality assistance to bridge the 
developmental gap seconds the Stabilisation and Association Process providing 
asymmetric trade liberalisation to stimulate economic production. Additionally, unlike 
East Central Europe, the international community provides guarantees for security in 
the form of military and policing forces throughout the region as well as diplomatic 
crisis management. In the experience of Eastern enlargement, regional co-operation 
was a consequence rather than a precondition for EU integration. However, for reasons 
of political and economic scale, development level, the tendency to national insularity, 
and political instability regional co-operation is a must for the Balkans.  
 
The promise of EU accession for the countries of the Western Balkans has become 
credible and concrete - particularly after the enlargement of 2004. Yet, a longer 
association phase of 10 to 15 years under the Stabilisation and Association Process 
seems to be the most plausible scenario. Bridging this transitional period requires not 
only good management of expectations on the part of the EU decision-makers and its 
counterparts in the region, but also tangible results in human security as well as in 
political and economic reform. 
 
Preventing the EU from becoming a hostage of the destabilising potentials of the 
region and of its own promise requires a strict, but fair conditionality with incentives 
and sanctions. The conditionality has to be responsive to the developments on the 
ground, without giving the impression that the production of stability risks pays off 
more readily than any uphill reform endeavour. The promise of EU accession is 
irrevocable as an Archimedean point, but the mere passing of time does not replace or 
soften its conditions. Thus, the European commitments in reform assistance cannot be 
separated from the requirement of a constructive and responsible approach to stability 
risks in Southeastern Europe. Ultimately, the political will and commitment of the 
regional leaders determines the success or failure of the European package consisting 
of a bilateral (pre)association process, regional co-operation and pro-active crisis 
management.  
  
 
… for Europe  … for Southeastern Europe 
How to uphold fair conditionality for 
EU association and integration without 
creating a new sub-region of outsiders 
unable to catch up with more advanced 
countries in the region?  
 How to sustain a political commitment 
to transition and EU integration during 
a longer transitional period without 
backsliding to national rhetoric or 
simulated reforms? 
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Despite being part of the explicit 
conditionality of EU integration, most forms 
of regional co-operation do make sense from 
a purely regional perspective, no matter if 
and when EU accession will take place. 
2. Regional Co-operation: From Stabilisation to Integration 
 
Regional co-operation, regionality and regional ownership have to become magic 
words to solve the inequality of massive international assistance and structural 
regional deficits, to resolve the tension between an accelerating process of European 
integration and a persistently volatile and unstable region to the Southeast. Regionality 
rather than conditionality constitutes the paradigm of the Stability Pact for 
Southeastern Europe. In the wake of the Pact, a whole range of new institutions and 
gatherings have dedicated themselves to achieving regional co-operation and to 
establishing regional ownership in their respective fields, some of them bottom-up, 
most of them top-down.  
 
The track record of regional co-operation is impressive as far the number of meetings, 
declarations and initiatives is concerned. Real but intractable structural problems like 
corruption and organised crime or environmental pollution are on the agenda of most 
initiatives, resulting in duplication and a waste 
of resources. Conversely, initiatives to exploit 
the obvious chances for co-operation, e.g. free 
trade, road (re)construction or border and visa 
regimes, face major hurdles due to lack of 
political will and flexibility. The impression remains that (sub)regional or cross-border 
co-operation is most effective when it takes place on a pragmatic, local and interest-
driven level - without getting entangled in national politics. Most of the new 
institutions, networks and initiatives may still be unknown to the citizens of the region. 
Multiple channels and fora for regional dialogue with different groupings and themes 
do have their merits, but there is an evident trade-off with the limited human resources 
of the state institutions involved. Conversely, functional co-operation requires an 
institutional and operational division of labour, not a random multiplication of 
initiatives. Even in civil-society initiatives, plurality is not tantamount to pluralism, 
institutional proliferation not a measure of success. 
 
Evidently, both politicians and the public are inclined to (mis)interpret the “directive” 
of regional co-operation by the European Union and by the Stability Pact as a 
rhetorical trick or delaying tactics in the integration process. There is widespread 
anxiety in some countries of the region that Brussels perceives the Western Balkans as 
a group in which the slowest candidate determines the pace of the integration process 
for all.  
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However, regional co-operation is not a zero-sum game. As regional co-operation 
promotes political stability and economic development, it cannot be detrimental to the 
shared EU perspective for the region. Functional forms of regional co-operation will 
never have a negative impact on the process towards EU integration for any country, 
albeit the actual catch-up effects may differ from country to country. Local cross-
border co-operation and civil-society networking contribute to a de-mystification of 
ethnic prejudices and a gradual normalisation of relations. More directly, economic 
growth can only be achieved when the region of small and smallest states banks on 
economies of scale by integrating a market of 25 million for producers and investors 
and by gradually erasing barriers to the free flow of persons, goods and capital within 
the region. The fact that most countries trade mainly with EU countries by no means 
devalues this priority. Uniform systems for tariffs and visa regimes are a first 
important step in the right direction. Transport infrastructure, energy grids and tourism 
are regional by default. Most forms of regional co-operation do make sense from a 
purely regional perspective, no matter if and when EU accession will take place. The 
experience of the EU member states and the ten accession states indicates that the 
value of regional co-operation and solidarity even increases with accession. Many 
forms of functional regional co-operation actually accelerate and facilitate the process 
of fulfilling the preconditions for EU association and eventual accession for all 
countries of the region, in addition to improving the actual preconditions for stability 
and prosperity in the region in the meantime. 
 
Nevertheless, the elusiveness of the panacea “regionality” as well as the tension 
between multilateral regional co-operation and the bilateral conditionality of the 
relations with the EU call for a qualification and differentiation of the concepts of 
regionality and ownership. The European Union and the Stability Pact should define 
and promote clear priorities in terms of functional forms of regional co-operation that 
are advantageous for each state in the region, both in terms of national interests and of 
the long-term EU perspective. Because of the protracted process towards EU 
membership, regional co-operation needs a dynamism and justification in its own 
right. 
 
From the perspective of EU integration as the Archimedean point and dominant 
framework for the Balkan region, a new congruence of multilateral regional co-
operation and bilateral EU association agreements will have to be designed and 
implemented to make timeframes synchronous and strategies complementary. The 
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, the quintessence of regional co-operation 
and ownership for the Western Balkans, was originally designed as a uniquely 
comprehensive approach to move South Eastern Europe towards stability and away 
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from its structural deficits in modernisation and its endemic track record of ethnic and 
territorial conflicts. Today, three years later, those who consider the Pact a failure have 
not this original objective in mind, but rather a more far-reaching endeavour. In the 
long-term endeavour of turning South Eastern Europe into a region of stability and 
prosperity as an integral part of an integrating Europe, however, the Stability Pact can 
only be one out of several stepping-stones, albeit an important one. 
 
With the fundamental changes that have been achieved in the region over the past 
three years the window of opportunity has been opened for the consolidation of 
functioning states, for regional co-operation and for European integration. The 
European Union and its Stabilisation and Association Process have become the main 
framework for the region. The Stability Pact becomes its auxiliary, shouldering a 
number of complementary tasks that are incompatibly with the set-up of the SAP. 
Complementarity, however, does not imply that the Stability Pact were to cover each 
imaginable task not dealt with in the framework of the SAP. As ownership is key, the 
Stability Pact should restrict itself to prioritising well-designed incentives and 
framework conditions rather than strive for comprehensiveness or the co-ordination 
and inclusion of all relevant initiatives and networks. The Tetovo crisis has proven that 
the Stability Pact and its Special Co-ordinator have a role to play in pro-active and re-
active crisis management. Many legacies of the crisis and war-ridden 1990s have to be 
resolved before or parallel to the SAP. Thorny issues with a clear regional dimension 
concern the return and/or reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons as 
well as the process of reconciliation between ethnic communities and between states. 
 
One complementary task already taken on by the SP with remarkable success is 
instigating a regional dialogue on functional forms of co-operation in regional 
ownership (e.g. in military and security affairs or free-trade agreements) by providing 
a framework and incentives. The bilateral, conditional relations of the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements are evidently inadequate for the instigation of a regional 
dialogue and the stimulation of regional co-operation. In regional co-operation defined 
by functionality, some initiatives may be sub-regional, while others cross the borders 
of the Balkans or Southeastern Europe as defined by the process of EU integration. 
Flexible forms of cross-regional, regional, sub-regional and cross-border co-operation 
actually profit from the fact that the vast majority of its inhabitants does not accept 
„the Balkans“ as a regional unity or an identifier. Whereas the heterogeneity of 
contractual relations - ranging from Romania’s Europe Agreement to Croatia’s 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement or Albania’s Trade and Co-operation 
Agreement – directly hampers regional co-operation, the EU’s apparent unwillingness 
to deal with (sub)regional groupings that are not congruent with the logic and divides 
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In a proactive, comprehensive regional 
negotiation process for the outstanding issues, 
the functioning of states takes priority over the 
sovereignty of states. 
of Eastern and Southeastern enlargement may well be counterproductive and a signal 
easily misunderstood. 
 
… for Europe  … for Southeastern Europe 
How to make functional regional co-
operation an auxiliary to EU 
integration without having initiatives 
defined by the borders of the region 
and not by considerations of 
functionality? 
 How to position regional co-operation 
in Southeastern Europe as a key asset in 
its own right instead of a delaying trick 
or a hollow political slogan from 
Brussels?  
 
 
 
3. Negotiating the Balkans: Status Issues and Robust Mediation  
 
The paper to last year’s roundtable Negotiating the Balkans outlined a regional 
negotiation process for status and non-status issues characterised by both “regional 
ownership” and a lead role for the European Union. In the aftermath of September 
11th, the European Union has indeed assumed the main burden of responsibility for 
conflict management and negotiation processes in the region. Ultimately it will be up 
to the EU to integrate the countries of the Western Balkans. The “war on terror” as the 
new dominant concern of US foreign policy has hastened this shift. The 2001 strategy 
paper argued the case for a proactive, comprehensive regional negotiation process 
rather than a reactive, event-oriented approach and give priority to the functioning of 
states over the sovereignty of states. Over the past year, international and most of all 
European organisations have shown increasing assertiveness in handling status-related 
issues in the triangle of Belgrade-Podgorica-Pristina, within Macedonia and within 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Assertiveness and political will also characterise the 
appointments of Erhard Busek as Special Coordinator for the Stability Pact, Lord 
Paddy Ashdown as High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Michael 
Steiner as UN Special Representative for Kosovo. 
 
Last year’s statement that the functioning of states has priority over and should 
precede status arrangements seems to be gaining ground in the region recently. 
Assertive protectorate regimes and robust mediation in status questions are justified by 
the fragility of regional stability (both as a European interest and a prerequisite for 
reform and prosperity in the region) as well as 
by the need to reach to durable, sustainable 
arrangements rather than to create new 
conflict potentials. In extremis, these motives 
do justify even the current restrictions to state sovereignty and democratic rule. 
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“The future of Kosovo is in Europe. The EU 
provides a unique model for achieving 
common goals, while respecting national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. … 
Kosovo needs Europe and Europe needs 
Kosovo to continue on its path toward 
democracy and European values.” 
 
Michael Steiner
Eventually, however, the process should be oriented towards restoring or installing 
sovereignty and democratic rule incrementally. Eventually, a next political generation 
will come to realise that political will and courage bridges the gap between democratic 
sovereignty and the conditionalities of the EU perspective.  
 
The strenuous combination of European responsibilities and regional ownership 
implies a quid pro quo in more than one respect. Irrespective of international legal 
personality, the ownership of sovereign rights implies obligations as much as rights 
vis-à-vis the entire population and the neighbouring states. The quid pro quo of the 
European perspective is a strict conditionality that has to be both transparent and 
consistent without being unresponsive to 
relevant political and public developments. 
One of the prerequisites for a gradual transfer 
of sovereign rights is a strict observance of 
human and minority rights. Being the majority 
nation in a state even implies a generosity 
towards minorities, as strict proportionality 
would result in the dictatorship of the majority. 
The acknowledgement of the fact that most majorities are themselves a minority in one 
or more neighbouring countries suggests a regional convention and monitoring of 
minority policies (rather than conflict-prone models of homeland patronage). 
Conversely, any talk of secession and partitioning (e.g. in the case of Mitrovica or 
Tetovo) would reinvigorate the illusion of the ethnic homogenous nation-state and 
thereby ignore the fate of the co-nationals living in other, ethnically mixed parts of the 
same state or state-like entity.  
 
Another quid pro quo relates to cases of defiance of (the letter or spirit of) the original 
agreements, be it the Dayton Peace Agreement, the Ohrid Agreement or UNSC 
resolution 1244. No government of a state or entity that tolerates or even actively 
engages in violations of these basic agreements can expect European support for a 
process of association and eventually integration. Only agreements that are respected 
by both parties can be modified or revised in consent. As existing arrangements do not 
prejudice final status, their strict implementation should not be instrumentalised to 
prejudice a future status arrangement. 
 
The European quid pro quo for a responsible and constructive attitude by the regional 
partners, respecting the imperfection and fragility of current status relations, is 
responsiveness and reliability. To this end, Europe should speak with one voice and its 
message should be both consistent and non-partisan. Formally, the EU was a neutral 
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mediator in the arrangements it has brokered via “robust mediation.” In reality, the 
sustainability of the arrangements very much depends on the readiness of the EU as a 
third party. The EU guides the follow-up process and assists the local elites in 
implementing the often-unpopular compromises. Conversely, all local politicians share 
responsibility for the negotiated arrangement and ought to refrain from scoring 
populist points by scorning the compromises in public, while making good use of the 
linked EU assistance in silence.  
 
For each of the status issues, Kosovo and Montenegro, the first step would be a 
pragmatic interim agreement based on the status quo without prejudicing any final 
status arrangement. This interim agreement would open a pragmatic window of 
opportunity in order to resolve some of the non-status issues that have to be resolved 
irrespective of the final status and in order to intensify bi- and multilateral co-
operation. The preference for interim arrangements ought not to imply that gaining 
time is a goal in and by itself. If temporising allowed the creation of a more stable and 
constructive basis for final-status negotiations, much would have been gained. In the 
medium term (3-5 years) latest, the issue of final status will be on the agenda again. 
Considering the current volatility of the status questions and the intransigence of the 
respective positions, it is hard to argue the case for immediate break-through solutions 
in one direction or the other. A certain consolidation and clarification of current reality 
in the status issues may have its merits, but only in combination with a consistent and 
tangible process towards final-status arrangements. The stability and sustainability of 
the resulting arrangements for the region as well as for Europe as a whole, however, is 
the decisive factor. At the same time, respect for existing borders as a corner stone of 
stability inevitably implies a domestic quid pro quo, the acceptance of multiethnicity 
and the establishment of generous minority rights.  
 
Designing a process towards final-status arrangements along these lines comes up 
against a fundamental dilemma. “Benchmarking” national achievements in terms of a 
functioning state implies incentive and conditionality and thus a reward in terms of 
sovereignty. Consequently, this objective constitutes a disincentive for constructive co-
operation (and for some maybe even an incentive for destabilising actions) to local and 
regional political actors with a contrasting agenda for a final-status arrangement. On 
the other hand, any viable status arrangement requires the consent of the relevant 
regional and international partners, if only because the current situation is based on 
UNSC resolution 1244 and other international agreements. Thus, international consent 
would take precedence over the quality of domestic reform and acquis compliance. At 
this point, the international community and its representatives in the region, 
specifically in Kosovo and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ought to capitalise on the 
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Regional stability is not only a 
European responsibility, but also part 
of regional ownership. 
“Dayton was designed to end a 
war, not to build a country. … 
But Dayton is the floor, not the 
ceiling.” 
 
Paddy Ashdown
population as their ally rather than to leave the local perceptions of international 
policies exclusively in the hand of local politicians.  
 
In contrast to a “roadmap” with a pre-defined destination, an “open” approach towards 
a final-status arrangement would focus on the process itself rather than the status 
outcome. Consequently, it would be much less of an incentive for pro-independence 
forces in Podgorica and Pristina to implement political and economic reforms as well 
as human and minority rights guarantees. The focus 
would shift to bi- and multilateral negotiations for 
agreements on non-status issues and most of them 
would get tangled up with status issues. Any EU-
mediated open negotiation process in regional ownership requires a well-designed 
framework and an unambiguous set of principles such as no redrawing of borders and 
no exchanges of territory or populations. The EU would be the guarantor of principles, 
framework conditions, procedures, and eventual outcomes. New arrangements have to 
meet the criteria of sustainability and regional stability. Therefore, regional stability is 
not only a European responsibility, but also part of regional ownership.  
 
The shared European perspective for the Balkans provides an incentive for functioning 
states and regional co-operation. The convergence of the region in EU association and 
integration in the medium term may even defuse some of the current controversies or 
make the disputed issues irrelevant. Whereas some sovereignty-related issues will in 
the long run become European responsibilities or prerogatives, the European 
perspective cannot erase or circumvent the status issues as 
such. Quite on the contrary, the process of EU association 
and integration via the SAP pertains to numerous 
sovereignty-related issues and therefore constantly 
reiterates the unresolved status questions of Kosovo and 
Montenegro. One such a key issue concerns the EU’s counterpart for the SAA 
negotiations and the corresponding CARDS assistance. Since Serbia, Montenegro and 
Kosovo are as heterogeneous as the Balkan region itself in their reform process and 
transition priorities, any effective EU “pre-accession” policy would have to consider 
these differences and differentiate conditionalities and assistance strategies 
accordingly. At the same time, negotiations and financial transfers have to abide by de 
jure sovereignty.  
 
Thus, robust mediation for an interim arrangement as practised by the European Union 
and its High Representative in the case of the recent Belgrade Agreement for “Serbia 
and Montenegro” is not an exit strategy. Quite on the contrary, even in the cases where 
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“Do not ask what the
international community can 
do for you. Ask first what you 
can do for yourselves.” 
 
Paddy Ashdown
the international community and the EU in particular formally only acts as a mediator, 
the resulting agreements depends on Europe taking responsibility for the protracted 
implementation process, be it provisional self-government in Kosovo, the new union 
of Serbia and Montenegro, integrative processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina or 
interethnic arrangements in Macedonia. 
 
… for Europe  … for Southeastern Europe 
How to preserve the openness of a 
negotiation process for the status issues 
without losing the leverage of 
conditionality for the functioning of 
states and state-like entities – and vice 
versa? 
 How to square progress in the 
Stabilisation and Association Process 
with the stalemate in the relevant 
sovereignty-related status issues?  
 
 
 
4. Integrating the Balkans: European Responsibilities and Regional Ownership 
 
After the first major round of Eastern enlargement in 2004, the dilemma of regionality 
and conditionality will come to a head in Southeastern Europe. On the one hand, the 
seven countries of the region will fall in different categories of relations with the EU 
and, on the other hand, they will all be excluded from the benefits of membership, 
sharing only the perspective. Paradoxically, 2004 could also be a chance for the 
region: The remaining pre-accession funds could be used – for instance via the 
Stability Pact - to support reform efforts in region and to prevent some less-developed 
countries from falling behind the regional process towards EU integration. 
In combination with the post-2004 strategic dilemma for “Southeastern enlargement”, 
the inherent tension between the regionality and conditionality as well as the 
historical-structural heterogeneity of the region may result in a new Balkans. The 
conditional approach of the Stabilisation and Association Process rewards 
achievements in transition and EU adaptation on a strictly 
bilateral basis with more assistance and more resources. 
Conversely, the regional approach of the Stability Pact 
supports the states and state-like entities most in need 
rather than the most advanced countries, with minimal 
conditionality in order to instigate a catch-up process and regional equalisation. The 
Stability Pact and other regional initiatives certainly accelerated the process of reform 
and reconstruction in the entire region, but most probably by 2004 the divide will have 
increased rather than decreased due to path dependency and the widely diverging 
initial situations of the countries. A process of Southeastern enlargement will require 
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the strategic and partly institutional convergence of SAP, Stability Pact and crisis 
management under an appealing label by 2004.    
 
Evidently, the current formal divide between the EU accession process for Romania 
and Bulgaria, on the one hand, and the Stabilisation and Association Process for the 
five countries of the Western Balkans, on the other, can be surpassed in one direction 
only. Consequently, a scenario with Croatia and Serbia-and-Montenegro joining the 
two remaining candidates after the first round of Eastern enlargement seems plausible. 
(Substantial economic and political progress in the neighbouring states of Serbia and 
Croatia may boost the reform and state-building process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
although a formal Stabilisation and Association Agreement seems out of reach for 
some years to come.) Conversely, the southern half of the Western Balkans, the sub-
region with the higher potential for conflict and the lower potential for economic 
development, would be left dependent on a much-depleted regional co-operation 
process. 
 
Additionally, the domestic political responsibility in the protectorate situations of 
Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina with a representative of the international 
community imposing most legislation by decree is incompatible with the political 
Copenhagen Criteria of democracy and good governance. No Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement can be signed before domestic political stability and 
responsibility are ensures and political decision-making is no longer in the hands of 
the international representative. On the other hand, the EU cannot afford to leave 
countries drop out off the integration process. They would end up as hotbeds of 
instability for the entire region in an integrating Europe. 
 
Seemingly attractive shortcuts like “partial” or “virtual” EU membership cannot 
resolve the dilemma of the protracted process of stabilisation, association and eventual 
integration. On a practical level, enhanced functional co-operation will be 
advantageous both for the enlarged EU and for its associated partners to the Southeast, 
e.g. in justice and home affairs or in environmental protection. As true regional co-
operation is most advanced in military and security affairs, more regional ownership in 
this area is an important signal, in combination with an increasing Europeanisation of 
the policing and security missions throughout the region. However, presenting 
practical forms of co-operation as incremental forms of membership would be the 
wrong signal for sustaining the reform momentum over a longer period of time. A 
sound management of expectations, however, requires both relevant and symbolic 
milestones in the long drawn-out phase of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
without accession negotiations.  
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In sum, the European Union should persevere in its engagement for the region without, 
however, yielding to the perceived pressure of envisaged timeframes or the stability 
risks emanating from apparent frustration and impatience. Giving in to these pressures 
would mean squandering fair conditionality and accepting simulated reforms and 
political rhetoric at face value. This very real danger would turn a virtuous circle of 
conditionality and regionality into a vicious circle of deceit and resignation.  
 
 
… for Europe  … for Southeastern Europe 
How to create meaningful stages in the 
Stabilisation and association Process 
without implying virtual or partial EU 
membership and thereby diluting 
conditionality?  
 How to square requirements of 
conditionality in the integration to the 
unacceptability of dropouts without 
making the EU a hostage of its own 
enlargement process? 
 
